Risk register · entry
Q3 · EngineeredRed Sea cable cuts
A sinking ship's dragging anchor cut Asia-Europe internet cables.
Tightly coupled systems where one small fault cascades and takes down the whole machine.
Why this quadrant
An anchor dragging across fibre is a routine break with a routine repair, normally weeks. These cables sat off a coast with two rival governments, and neither could issue a permit the other would honour. The cut was ordinary and the outage lasted five months, because what needed fixing was not the cable.
The record
- Rubymar hit by Houthi anti-ship missile on 18 February 2024certain
- Rubymar sank on 2 March 2024 (2:15am local / 23:15 GMT March 1), after ~12 days adriftcertain
- Cargo: approximately 21,000 metric tons of fertilizer aboardcertain
- Three cables cut: SEACOM, AAE-1, EIGcertain
- Cut cables carried approximately 25% of regional (Middle East/Asia-Europe corridor) data traffic, per HGC Global Communicationslikely
- AAE-1 cable restored/online mid-July 2024 (repair vessel Niwa, operated by E-Marine)likely
- SEACOM and EIG repairs completed by late July 2024, per Houthi-controlled Yemeni ministry statementsuncertain
- Repair delayed for months by permit disputes between Yemen's rival governmentscertain
- No public dollar cost figure found for the outage or repair; not stated in any source revieweduncertain
Sources
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